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Sometimes, we need or try to figure out somebody's thoughts from his or her behaviors
such as eye movement, facial expression, gestures, and motions. In safety-critical and
complex systems such as nuclear power plants, the inference of operators' thoughts (un-
derstanding or diagnosis of a current situation) might provide a lot of opportunities for
useful applications, such as development of an improved operator training program, a new
type of operator support system, and human performance measures for human factor
validation. In this experimental study, a novel method for inference of an operator's
thoughts from his or her eye movement data is proposed and evaluated with a nuclear
power plant simulator. In the experiments, about 80% of operators' thoughts can be
inferred correctly using the proposed method.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
Sometimes, we need to figure out somebody's thoughts from
his or her behaviors such as eye movement, facial expression,
gestures, and motions. Usually, inference of somebody's
thoughts from his or her behaviors is associated with a lot of
uncertainty, because the same behaviors might have different
meanings depending on the context. However, if a person is
carrying out his or her job in a very specific situation, the un-
certainty coupled with the inference of the person's thoughts
from his or her behaviors can be reduced and the inference of
thoughts could be utilized for some useful applications.S. Ha).
d under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behaOperational tasks in control rooms of nuclear power plants
(NPPs) are one of the representative examples that have very
specific job characteristics. Generally, operators' tasks in NPPs
constitute cognitive activities such asmonitoring anddetecting
the environment; understanding, assessing, and diagnosing
situations; decision making; planning responses; and imple-
menting responses [1]. If operators' thoughts on a situation (or
diagnosis result) can be inferred from the observation of their
behaviors, this knowledge would have great potential for
enhancing safety during NPP operation. As shown in the Tree
Mile Island accident, a correct diagnosis has been considered as
one of the most critical contributions to safe operation of NPPsCreative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
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rapidly been applied to various plant systems including NPPs,
operators' role in advanced control rooms has been changed
from a controller to a supervisor [3e5]. In themajority of cases,
the primary means of information input to operators in NPP
control rooms is through the visual channel. Operators in NPPs
are required to monitor several information sources such as
indicators, alarms, controllers, and mimic displays provided in
advanced control rooms, but they have limited capacity with
respect to attention and memory. Hence, NPP operators pay
selective attention to relevant and important information
sources to effectively understand the current status [6].
Yarbus [7] conducted an important eye tracking research,
showing that the task given to a person has a very large in-
fluence on that person's eye movement. The eye movement
pattern during examination of pictures was dependent not
only on what was shown in the picture, but also on the prob-
lem faced by the observer and the information that he or she
hoped to gain from the picture. Eye movement data have also
been studied in the field of intention inference. A fuzzy infer-
encemethodwasproposed to infer human intentions fromeye
movement data during monitoring of tasks on a computer
screen [8]. The intention of the observer tomove eye gaze from
one point to another on the screen was inferred by applying a
fuzzy logic based on a fuzzy set. A truck driver's intention to
change lanes could be detected and inferred fromhis or her eye
movement data [9]. The driver's eye movement pattern while
changing the lane was analyzed, and a state transition model
representing the likelihood of the driver changing the lanewas
developed based on the analyzed pattern. The authors have
developed measures of fixation to importance ratio (FIR) and
selective attention effectiveness (SAE) based on eyemovement
data, which represent how effectively an operator attends to
important information sources as measures of attentional-
resource effectiveness in monitoring tasks [10]. The FIR is the
ratio of attentional resources (i.e., the number and duration of
eye fixations) used on an information source to the importance
of the information source. The SAE incorporates the FIRs for all
information sources. In this experimental study, a novel
method for inference of the operators' thoughts (understand-
ing or diagnosis of a current situation) from their eye move-
ment data is proposed and evaluated. The inferencemethod is
based on the FIR and SAE evaluation. In the second section, the
cognitive processes of attention, understanding, and diagnosis
are addressed to understand the principles underlying the
method of approach, and the FIR and the SAE are introduced.
The inferencemethod is explained with examples of accidents
occurring in NPPs. The experimental study is addressed in the
third section followed by discussion in the fourth section, and
the conclusion in the fifth section.2. Inferring operators' thoughts from eye
movement data
2.1. Attention, understanding, and diagnosis in NPPs
NPP operators generally keep monitoring the plant systems to
detect any problems that may take place during normaloperation. If an abnormal situation is detected, they search for
relevant information sources to figure out what the problem is.
Information processing is dependent on a pool of attention or
mental effort, which is of limited availability and can be allo-
cated to processes as required [11]. In terms of attentional
resources, selection of information sources for further infor-
mation processing should be addressed, as well as dividing
attention between tasks. Selection of information sources is
governedbysalience,expectancy,value,andeffort [12]. Salience
refers to stimuli in the environment such as alarms, alerts, or
some remarkable indication prompting attention. Expectancy
makes attention shift to specific sources that are most likely to
provide information. The value of the information source ad-
justs the frequency of looking at it. If toomuch effort is required
in comparison with the value of the information source, atten-
tion might be restricted. The first studies on monitoring or in-
formation searching behavior were carried out for flight
maneuver tasks in the late 1940s and early 1950s [13e15]. The
relative importance (value) of information sourceswas reported
as a governing factor in information searching behavior during
flight maneuver tasks [15]. Senders showed that bandwidth
(event rate) also plays a significant role inmonitoring tasks [16],
which have been subsequently elaborated to consider value
with the bandwidth by a lot of researchers [17e40]. The band-
width contributes not only to expectancy, but also to value. It
provides operators with the expectancy of the location of in-
formation sources and valuable information for diagnosis in
more detail. For example, if there is a rupture of a pipe through
which water flows, the change in the flow rate of water due to
the rupture provides information on the size of the rupture.
Effort and salience may influence the selection of information
sources to the extent that designers have adhered to good
human factor practice in display layout [26]. Hence, effort and
salience should be considered during the design phase by
correlating effort and salience with expectancy and value.
When multiple tasks require to be performed at the same
time, a strategy must be developed for dividing attention or
allocating resources between tasks [41,42]. Perception or un-
derstanding consists of three simultaneous processes: bottom-
up processing, top-down processing, and unitization (or
matching). Stimuli or salient information sources derive the
bottom-up processing through sensing mechanisms. After
detecting a stimulus, the information is matched to a mental
model that is established based on knowledge and experience.
The effective selection of information sources is made by ex-
pectancy derived from the mental model, which is referred to
as top-down processing. The chain of bottom-up processing,
top-down processing, and unitization is the process of
perception or understanding. A lot of information sources are
provided in NPP control rooms, and operators have limited
capacity of attention and memory. Operators have to selec-
tively allocate their attentional resources. Selective attention is
employed to overcome the limitations of human attention,
making use of both top-down and bottom-up processes [12]. In
abnormal situations in an NPP, operators collect a bunch of
information from the humanemachine interface (HMI) or
other operators, and try to understand the abnormal situation,
which is a process of establishing a situation model based on
their mental model. The situationmodel is constantly updated
as new information is received [43]. The mental model
Table 1 e Representative behaviors of FISA2 simulator.
State PRZ
indicators
S/G (A)
indicators
S/G (B)
indicators
Others
L P T L FF SF L FF SF
Normal
LOCA Y Y Y
SGTR (A) Y Y Y [ YY [ Y [ Y
SGTR (B) Y Y Y Y [ Y [ YY [
SLB (A) [ YY [[ [ Y [
SLB (B) [ Y [ [ YY [[
FLB (A) Y [[ Y [ Y [
FLB (B) [ Y [ Y [[ Y
FF, feed flow; FLB (A), feed line break in loop A; FLB (B), feed line
break in loop B; L, level; LOCA, loss of coolant accident; P, pressure;
PRZ, pressurizer; SF, steam flow; S/G (A), steam generator in loop A;
S/G (B), steam generator in loop B; SGTR (A), steam generator tube
rupture in loop A; SGTR (B), steam generator tube rupture in loop B;
SLB (A), steam line break in loop A; SLB (B), steam line break in loop
B; T, temperature; [, increase; [[, rapid increase; Y, decrease; YY,
rapid decrease.
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the mental model refers to the knowledge of plant system be-
haviors in various situations, which derive expectancies about
information sources during abnormal situations. Knowledge of
system behaviors in NPPs should be established in an opera-
tor's mental model through education, training, and experi-
ence. For example, if a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occurs in
an NPP, pressure, temperature, and level of the pressurizer
(PRZ) would decrease, and the containment radiation would
increase. These expectancies form some rules about plant
system behaviors, and operators' mental models are estab-
lished based on these rules. Usually, alarms or indicators that
showdeviation fromnormal conditions help operators detect a
problem. The operators then develop their situation model
with selective attention to important information sources.
Moreover, an update of their situation model is achieved by
iterating the selective attention. Hence, effective selective
attention should correspond to correct understanding.
In highly complex technical installations involving high
hazards such as NPPs, diagnosis is a crucial part of distur-
bance control [44]. A diagnostic task for response selection
during abnormal situations in NPPs generally involves moni-
toring and detection of an abnormal situation, investigation of
symptoms, reasoning for a possible cause, and a diagnostic
judgment of the current situation. As a representative
example of accidental situations, the steam generator tube
rupture (SGTR) is investigated to understand the diagnosis
process in NPPs. If the pressure, temperature, and level of the
PRZ decrease, then an SGTR and an LOCAwould be competing
hypotheses. In order to diagnose the accident correctly, other
parameters should be checked out. The LOCA is usually
associated with an increase in the containment radiation. If
there is no change in the containment radiation, the accident
would be an SGTR. A set of symptoms is usually associated
with an abnormal state of an NPP (i.e., situationeevents re-
lations) [37]. Considering that symptoms usually provide in-
formation for diagnosis of an accident, two kinds of
symptoms should be addressed: symptoms representing a
changed part (e.g., onset of alarm or deviation in a process
variable) and symptoms that are not changed but provide
diagnostic information. In the STGR example, no change in
the containment radiation represents a kind of stationary
symptom capable of differentiating the SGTR from the LOCA.
Even when the symptoms are not changed, operators should
pay selective attention to stationary symptoms so that they
understand the situation correctly. The expectancy on these
symptoms plays a significant role for correct diagnosis. After
figuring out what the accident is, additional diagnoses might
be required to find out details such as the location and size of a
rupture, the amount of coolant leaked, and so on, which can
be investigated by analyzing the bandwidths (event rates) of
the process parameters (symptoms). If the process parameters
of symptoms change very fast, operators are supposed to di-
agnose the situation as a large SGTR. On the contrary, if their
values change slowly, operators would assess the situation as
a small SGTR. Hence, the correct diagnosis during an
abnormal situation should correspond to effective selective
attention on important (or relevant) symptoms. Sets of be-
haviors (dynamics) of the simulator used in this experimental
study are summarized in Table 1.2.2. Attentional-resource effectiveness
Attentional resources of operators in NPPs should be allocated
to valuable sources of information in order to effectively
monitor, detect, correctly understand, and diagnose the state
of a system, since operators receive toomuch information and
they have limited attentional resources. Two measures of
attentional-resource effectiveness have been developed by
the authors for monitoring tasks in NPPs [10]. The measures
are based on the underlying principle that attentional re-
sources should selectively be allocated to information sources
according to their informational importance. In the SGTR
example, the pressure, temperature, and level of the PRZ are
definitely important information sources, and selective
attention should be paid to these sources in proportion to their
importance. A measure of attentional-resource effectiveness
for an individual information source is defined as the relative
attentional resources consumed on the information source
divided by the relative importance of the information source.
The attentional resource to importance of information source
ratio (AIR) is given as follows:
AIRðiÞ ¼ relative attentional resources on information  i
relative importance of information  i
(1)
Both the relative attentional resources and the relative
importance of each information source should be normalized
to range from zero to unity because they are relative mea-
sures. Information is provided to operators in NPP control
rooms primarily through the visual channel. Hence, the AIR is
converted into a measure that is expressed in terms of visual
resources, FIR, as follows:
FIRNðiÞ ¼
NiPk
i¼1 Ni
uiPk
i¼1 ui
(2)
Fig. 1 e Setting up of the AHP for the evaluation of informational importance. AHP, analytical hierarchy process; AOI, area of
interest; IE, informative expectancy; IV, informative value.
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DiPk
i¼1 Di
uiPk
i¼1 ui
(3)
FIRðiÞ ¼ FIR
NðiÞ þ FIRDðiÞ
2
(4)
where,
FIRN(i) ¼ FIR with respect to number of fixations
FIRD(i) ¼ FIR with respect to duration of fixations
Ni ¼ the number of eye fixation on information source-i
Di ¼ the duration of eye fixation on information source-i
k ¼ total number of information sources
ui ¼ importance of information source-i
A lot of studies on information searching or visual sam-
pling behaviors have employed fixation frequency or/and
fixation dwell time [10,13e16,26,40]. Fixation frequency, dwell
time, or an integrated measure such as the average value of
both could be used as a visual resource. In this study, the
average value is employed for the calculation of FIR using Eq.
(4). The relative attentional resources consumed on an infor-
mation source should be equal to the relative importance of
the information source in order tomaximize the effectiveness
of the attentional resources. Consequently, all FIR(i) should
approach unity for the best effectiveness. The FIR is the ratio
of relative attentional resources consumed on an information
source to the relative importance of the information source.
The FIR represents the attentional-resource effectiveness for
each information source. The SAE incorporates the FIRs for all
information sources, as follows:
SAE ¼
Pk
i¼1
jFIRðiÞ  1j
k
(5)
Hence, the SAE represents the overall attentional-resource
effectiveness based on all information sources. The SAE
should approach zero to maximize the overall attentional-
resource effectiveness, because all FIR(i) should approach
unity for the best effectiveness. An eye tracking system isused to obtain the eye fixation data (e.g., number and dura-
tion). The analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is applied to
quantify the importance of information sources based on
system behaviors [45].
2.3. Quantification of informational importance
Generally, normal operating conditions in NPPs are consid-
ered as safe conditions. No drastic change is observed during
the normal operating conditions. Attention is paid to opera-
tors' monitoring behaviors during abnormal states such as
accidents, incidents, or transient conditions. If an accident
occurs in an NPP, operators should collect and integrate a
symptom set of important information sources to correctly
diagnose the current accident. The informational importance
of an information source should be a function of its ability to
differentiate between competing hypotheses (competing ac-
cidents) of the cause of a plant symptom. Hence, a set of the
informational importance for an abnormal state is evaluated
by considering a symptom set that has the ability to be
diagnostic across a set of competing hypotheses. The
following quotation from the report of Stubler et al [46] pro-
vides the basis for the quantification of the informational
importance:
“NPP operators learn through experience where and when
to look in their work environment to gain the greatest in-
formation, and selectively focus attention on these sour-
ces. In dynamic environments, such as NPPs, there is a
tendency for operators to attend to those sources that
change most frequently (i.e., contain the most information
in terms of bits per unit of time), or are likely to change
given the current situation. These are examples of top-
down processing (e.g., based on their understanding of
the current situation, operators develop expectations of
information sources that will provide the most useful
information).”
Emphasis has been placed on the importance of informa-
tion sources that change most frequently and are likely to
change given a situation. In addition, it should be noted that
information sources that do not change but have the ability to
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containment radiation in the preceding SGTR example, should
be considered as important symptoms [47]. Hence, the attri-
bute corresponding to the frequent change of the source
(bandwidth) is denoted by an “informative value (IV),” and the
attribute of the diagnostic symptom set including changing
and unchanging symptoms is denoted by “informative ex-
pectancy (IE).”
Sets of the informational importance were evaluated for
various accidents using the AHP, which generally involves the
following four steps [45]:
 Step 1: Setting up the hierarchy by breaking the problem
into a hierarchy of interrelated elements
 Step 2: Collecting input data by pairwise comparison of
elements
 Step 3: Using the eigenvalue method to estimate the rela-
tive weights of elements
 Step 4: Aggregating the relative weights of elements to
arrive at a set of relative importance for information
sources
As shown in Fig. 1, a hierarchy is built for evaluating the
informational importance. The informational importance of
an accident (e.g., SGTR or LOCA) is placed at the top level, and
divided into IE and IV at Level 2. An area of interest (AOI) refers
to a region of HMIs that has information sources of impor-
tance. At Level 3, AOIs of important components [e.g., PRZ or
steam generator (S/G)] are located. “Others” at Level 3 include
all AOIs that do not have information sources important to the
relevant accident. An AOI at Level 3 might break down into
sub-AOIs such as indicator level, if the AOI at Level 3 has
several indicators (e.g., level, pressure, or temperature).
Development of the AHP depends on the quality of eye
tracking measurements. If AOIs can be discriminated at an
indicator level with an eye tracking system, a hierarchy with a
depth of five levels can be developed, and another set of IE and
IV are located at Level 4. If AOIs can be discriminated not at an
indicator level but only at a component level, the hierarchy
should have a depth of three levels.
After completing the hierarchy, input data (rating scales)
are obtained to quantify the informational importance of
AOIs. Input data comprise judgment matrices of pairwise
comparisons in the AHP. Elements in one level are compared
with each other in a pairwise manner according to their
contribution to achieving the criteria of the next higher level.
Input data of a judgment matrix are collected by questioning
which one is more important or contributing to an element in
the next higher level relatively to other one in the same level.
If the ijth element of the judgment matrix is inputted, the jith
element is inputted by its reciprocal value. Since it is recip-
rocal and the diagonal elements are equal to unity, the num-
ber of pairwise comparisons required for a judgmentmatrix of
order n is n(n e 1)/2. A reliable scale should be developed to
transform these qualitative statements into numbers for the
quantification. The AHP provides a reliable scale, the defini-
tion of which is explained in Table 2.
The judgment matrix is used for evaluation of the relative
importance of the elements in the AHP. The eigenvalue
method proposed by Saaty [45] has been preferred for the
Fig. 2 e (A) Normal GUIs of FISA2 simulator. (B) Faulty GUIs of FISA2 simulator. DV, dump valve; FF, feed flow; GUI, graphic
user interface; MSIV, main steam isolation valve; P, pressure; PORV, power operated relief valve; SF, steam flow; SV, safety
valve; T, temperature; TBN, turbine.
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the bottom level is calculated by multiplying the relative
weights from the top to the bottom elements.
In this study, values of the rating scale that were inputted
into a judgmentmatrixwere evaluated based on the behaviors
of the system (i.e., an NPP system in this study). Hence, more
reliable quantification is made compared with other AHP ap-
plications based only on the decision maker's expertise or
opinion. A detailed process for the quantification used in this
study is explained in the “Experiments” section.
2.4. Inference of operators' thoughts from eye movement
data
Hume's epistemology provides a philosophical basis for the
eyeemind hypothesis [48]. This hypothesis suggests that
cognitive processing automatically takes place whenever in-
formation is visually perceived. It was postulated that eye fix-
ations have a close correlation with visual attention [49].
Empirical evidence shows that eye movements are linked to
attention as well [50,51]. The eyeemind hypothesis contrasts
with the information-processing theory, suggesting that if in-
formation is perceived, a cognitive process is developed using
someof the information,while the restof the information isnot
included [52]. However, the eyeemind hypothesis is applicable
to the context of complex industrial systems such as NPPs,
whichhaverepresentativesystembehaviors.Operators insuch
systems generally have well-developed knowledge (or mental
models) of system behaviors through training and experience,
and any information given to them is of potential significance
for the operation of the system [53]. Usually, operators in NPP
control rooms are highly experienced and trained periodically
to establish the knowledge of system behaviors. Theimportance of individual information sources can be evaluated
on the basis of the knowledge of system behaviors. There are
thousands of information sources in NPPs, and even highly
experienced operators cannot attend to all the information
sources in abnormal situations. They pay selective attention to
important information sources on the basis of their knowledge
(mental model) to effectively understand the situation, which
facilitates correct diagnosis of the situation. Effective selective
attention to important symptoms or information sources
should correspond with correct understanding and eventually
correct diagnosis during abnormal situations, given that the
operator have well-developed knowledge of system behaviors.
This type of thought of anoperator (understandingor diagnosis
of a current situation) can be inferred from his or her selective
attention pattern, which is analyzed based on the SAE evalua-
tion. The better an operator selectively attends to information
sources according to their informational importance, the lower
the SAE value is expected to be, because the SAE should
approach zero to maximize the overall attentional-resource
effectiveness. If a diagnostic task with a specific accident
simulation is given to an operator who has well-established
knowledge of system behaviors, the operator is expected to
make a good selective attention according to the importance of
information sources for the specific accident. However, if the
SAE evaluation ismade using sets of informational importance
of events other than the relevant accident, the SAE valuewould
be higher than that with the sets of informational importance
of the relevant accident. For example, if an SGTR occurs, an
operator who has well-established knowledge of system be-
haviors should know which information sources are more to
the SGTR and which are less important. The operator should
pay selective attention to information sources that are impor-
tant to the SGTR, to correctly understand and diagnose the
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mational importance for the SGTR should show a lower value
(better selective attention) than the SAEs calculatedwith those
for other accidents.
In this study, an accident is simulated with an NPP simu-
lator, and each of the participating operators is required to
monitor system behaviors, understand the situation, and
finally report their diagnosis results. Eye movement data ob-
tained during the simulation are used for the calculation of
SAE with sets of informational importance for all possible
accidents. The accident that is associated with the best SAE
value (the lowest value) among all possible accidents should
agree with the accident inserted into the simulation, given
that the participant understands and diagnoses the situation
correctly. The accident with the best SAE value (the lowest
value) among all possible accidents is compared with that
inserted into the simulation in each run of the simulation. The
concordance rate (CR), which represents the agreement be-
tween the accident inserted into the simulation and that
inferred from the best SAE evaluation, is calculated as a per-
formance index of the inference of an operator's thought.
Hence, the operator's thoughts (understanding or diagnosis of
a current situation) can be inferred from his or her eye
movement data by identifying the accident that shows the
best SAE value (the lowest value) among all possible accidents.3. Experiments
3.1. Pilot experiments
A pilot experiment was conducted to adjust the experiment
setting with the FISA2 real-time simulator, which simulates a
pressurized water reactor-type NPP [54]. An eye tracking sys-
tem, FaceLAB 3.0 [55], was used to obtain eye fixation data
such as eye fixation points and durations. The graphic user
interface (GUI) of the FISA2 simulator was modified to
enhance the measurement quality of the eye fixation data.
Components and indicators placed too closely were relocated
to be apart from each other, as shown in Fig. 2A. In addition,
the FIR analysis revealed a problem in the existing GUI design
of the FISA2 simulator. For all participants, regardless of their
expertise level, the FIR of the S/G level indicators showed
remarkably low values both in loop A and in loop B, which
means that few eye fixations were made on S/G level in-
dicators compared to their informational importance. The S/G
levels were presented by a bar-type graph without any nu-
merical value. Participants of the pilot experiment reported
that since no numerical value had been provided on these
indicators, it was very difficult to perceive the trend of level
change. Hence, numerical indicators presenting the changed
amount for the S/G level were added at the top of the bar in-
dicator, as shown in Figs. 2A and 2B.
3.2. Objective, tasks, participants, and apparatus
This experimental study aims to see the feasibility of infer-
ence of operators' thoughts (understanding or diagnosis of a
current situation) by analyzing the operators' eye movementpatterns based on SAE evaluation. In this study, NPP accidents
were simulated with the FISA2 simulator and participating
operators were required to monitor system behaviors, un-
derstand the situation, and finally report their diagnosis re-
sults. Eye movement data were obtained with an eye tracking
system, FaceLAB 3.0, during the simulation. The eye move-
ment data were used to calculate the SAE values with sets of
informational importance of all possible accidents, among
which the accident coupled with the best SAE value (the
lowest value) should correspond to the accident inserted into
the simulation, given that the operator understands and di-
agnoses the situation correctly. CRs between the inserted ac-
cident and the inference results based on the best SAE
evaluation were calculated for 15 operators according to their
knowledge (mental model) levels. Two CRs, CR-1 and CR-2,
were calculated in this study. CR-1 is a CR between the
inserted accident and the inference results based on the best
SAE evaluation. CR-2 is another CR-1 given that the operator
has diagnosed the situation correctly. Hence, the CRs can be
regarded as performance indexes on how well the proposed
approach can infer the operators' thoughts (understanding or
diagnosis of a current situation). The SAE values have mean-
ings only when operators have well-developed knowledge of
system behaviors. If an operator does not have enough
knowledge of system behaviors, he or she may look at infor-
mation sources without any intention, which is against the
eyeemind hypothesis. To investigate this knowledge effect,
the operator knowledge levels were controlled by a training
program and the time interval (6 months) between experi-
ment trials (i.e., Experiment 1 and Experiment 2). The HMI
design effect, which was explained in the pilot experiment
section, was also considered. The HMI design was controlled
by the normal and the faulty HMI designs, as shown in Figs. 2A
and 2B.
The plant system states were assumed to include the
normal operating condition and the following seven accident
conditions:
 LOCA: loss of coolant accident
 SGTR (A): steam generator tube rupture (loop A)
 SGTR (B): steam generator tube rupture (loop B)
 SLB (A): steam line break (loop A)
 SLB (B): steam line break (loop B)
 FLB (A): feed line break (loop A)
 FLB (B): feed line break (loop B)
Six tasks inclusive of SGTR (A) and SLB (B) were given to the
study participants randomly. The SGTR (A) and SLB (B) cases
were analyzed for the CR calculations because they were re-
ported in the pilot experiments to bemost difficult to diagnose
among the tasks.
The participants were graduate students (14 males and 1
female) with 5.2 years of nuclear engineering background on
average. They performed the role of operators in the experi-
ments. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The
purpose, experimental procedure, and taskswere explained to
them prior to the experiments. Diagnostic tasks were per-
formed by them before and after the training in Experiments 1
and 2. All 15 participating operators from Experiment 1
returned for Experiment 2. After each experiment, a small
Fig. 3 e Setting up of the AHP for the SGTR (A). AHP, analytical hierarchy process; CR, concordance rate; FF, feed flow; IE,
informative expectancy; IV, informative value; L, level; P, pressure; PRZ, pressurizer; S-A, steam generator A; S-B, steam
generator B; SF, steam flow; S/G (A), steam generator in loop A; S/G (B), steam generator in loop B; SGTR (A), steam generator
tube rupture in loop A; T, temperature.
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results and their visual attention strategy.
Experiment 1was conductedwith the FISA2 simulatorwith
the normal GUI, as shown in Fig. 2A. At the beginning of this
study, only the knowledge effect was considered. However,
after Experiment 1 the idea to consider the HMI design effect
(normal vs. faulty GUI designs) came up and Experiment 2 was
conducted with the normal and the faulty designs. The
normal GUI design was identical to that used in Experiment 1.
The faulty GUI design had the design deficiency found in the
pilot experiment, as shown in Fig. 2B. In Experiment 2, the
normal and the faulty GUI designs were applied to SGTR (A)
and SLB (B), respectively. FaceLAB 3.0 was employed to mea-
sure the number and duration of eye fixations. As a lower
bound of dwell times for the eye movement measurement, a
figure of around 0.5 seconds was suggested for real-life tasks,
although shorter times might be observed in some laboratory
experiments when static, rather than dynamic, patterns are
used as displays [33]. In scene perception and reading tasks,
fixation duration ranged from 0.15 seconds to 0.6 seconds [56].
The fixation dwell time was 0.2e0.5 seconds in simple target
tracing or detecting tasks [57e59]. In this study, AOIs were
located at predefined areas, and only values in the AOIs were
changed dynamically. Consequently, a value of lower than 0.5
seconds (i.e., the lower bound reported) was deemed to be
more appropriate in defining the fixation. From the investi-
gation of eye fixation data in the pilot test, a value of 0.25
seconds was empirically selected as a lower bound to opera-
tionally define a single fixation. A circular fixation area was
employed in this study to define fixation. The fixation circle
was larger than any indicator of the FISA2 simulator. If thefixation circle overlapped an indicator or an AOI for 0.25 sec-
onds or more, it was counted as a single fixation.
3.3. Quantification of informational importance
The AHP was applied to quantify the relative importance of
each information source. Behaviors of the system of interest
are mainly described by indicators of process parameters and
facilitate pairwise comparison between indicators for quan-
tification. Table 1 provides a summary of behaviors of the
simulator used in this study. One or more indicator(s) might
be associated with a component. Component level is a higher
level than the indicator level. Fig. 3 shows an example of the
SGTR (A) case for the AHP. The overall hierarchy consists of
five levels. The first level (Level 1) of informational importance
has two second-level (Level 2) elements: IE and IV. There
might be a controversy on whether the IE or the IV is more
important to the informational importance. The bandwidth
(change rate) will attract selective attention given that the IE
(symptom sets) is not considered, which is a data-driven
monitoring process [48]. On the other hand, the symptom
sets (i.e., the situationeevent relationships) will engage se-
lective attention given that the IV (bandwidth) is ignored,
which is considered to be a knowledge-driven monitoring
process [38]. Since close correlations between process pa-
rameters are generally observed in NPPs, knowledge-driven
monitoring should be considered as important as data-
driven monitoring. Hence, even weighting 0.5 to both the IE
and the IV is thought to be reasonable in NPPs. Behaviors of
the FISA2 simulator were thoroughly analyzed to quantify the
relative weights of components or indicators with respect to
Table 4 e The t test results of the MMS.
Experiment
(averaged MMS)
The t test results:
t value, degree of freedom, p
1B (31.98) versus 2B (43.95) t ¼ 3.25, df ¼ 14, p < 0.01
1B (31.98) versus 1A (88.37) t ¼ 13.28, df ¼ 14, p < 0.01
2B (43.95) versus 1A (88.37) t ¼ 12.42, df ¼ 14, p < 0.01
2B (43.95) versus 2A (97.26) t ¼ 16.56, df ¼ 14, p < 0.01
df, degree of freedom; MMS, mental model score; 1A, Experiment 1
after training; 1B, Experiment 1 before training; 2A, Experiment 2
after training; 2B, Experiment 2 before training.
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sponds to the component level, whereas the fifth level (Level
5) represents the indicator level. The fourth level (Level 4)
plays the same role as the second level and even weighting of
0.5 is given to both the IE (k) and the IV (k), where k ¼ PRZ,
steam generator A, or steam generator B. If the indicators of
the pressurizer level (PRZ_L), pressure (PRZ_P), and tempera-
ture (PRZ_T) show decreases, three hypothetical accidents,
LOCA, SGTR (A), or SGTR (B), are expected to compete. In order
for operators to correctly diagnose the situation among the
three competing hypotheses, additional information from the
S/G (A) and S/G (B) indicators of L, feed flow (FF), and steam
flow (SF)should be obtained as shown in Table 1. However,
“Others” indicators in Table 1 that are not related to the PRZ, S/
G (A), and S/G (B) do not changewhen PRZ_L, PRZ_P, and PRZ_T
decrease. Sets of information provided by nine indicators of
process parameters for the PRZ, S/G (A), and S/G (B) constitute
the symptoms used for the diagnosis in this study. Hence, the
nine indicators have the same importance in terms of the IE
(see the 3 judgment matrices having all the elements of unity
located in each left-side image at the bottom of Fig. 3). The
three components PRZ, S/G (A), and S/G (B) have the same
importance in terms of the IE between Levels 2 and 3, which
leads to an input value of unity to the judgmentmatrix located
in the upper left-hand side of Fig. 3. However, the “Others” in
Fig. 3 do not include any significant symptoms, whereas each
of PRZ, S/G (A), and S/G (B) does. Each of PRZ, S/G (A), and S/G
(B) is muchmore important than the “Others,” giving an input
value of nine to the judgment matrix located in the upper left-
hand side of Fig. 3. In terms of the IV, weights of components
or indicators can be evaluated more easily. Observation of the
system behaviors provides objective information on the
bandwidth (change rate) of indicators. For instance, the
change rate of PRZ_L was two times faster than that of PRZ_P
and three times faster than that of PRZ_T, as shown in the
second matrix from the left at the bottom of Fig. 3. All otherTable 3 e Sets of informational importance.
Components (AOIs) LOCA SGTR (A) SLB (A) FLB (A)
Informational importance at component level
PRZ 0.5357 0.2921 0.1964 0.2122
S/G (A) 0.2024 0.4316 0.4822 0.4458
S/G (B) 0.2024 0.2265 0.2679 0.291
Others 0.0595 0.0498 0.0536 0.051
Informational importance at indicator level
PRZ-L 0.2338 0.1275 0.0655 0.0707
PRZ-P 0.1688 0.092 0.0655 0.0707
PRZ-T 0.1331 0.0726 0.0655 0.0707
S/G (A)-L 0.0675 0.0959 0.1148 0.0907
S/G (A)-FF 0.0675 0.2157 0.2181 0.2267
S/G (A)-SF 0.0675 0.12 0.1492 0.1247
S/G (B)-L 0.0675 0.0604 0.0581 0.0491
S/G (B)-FF 0.0675 0.1057 0.125 0.1027
S/G (B)-SF 0.0675 0.0604 0.0848 0.1027
Others 0.0595 0.0498 0.0536 0.051
AOI, area of interest; FF, feed flow; FLB (A), feed line break in loop A;
L, level; LOCA, loss of coolant accident; P, pressure; PRZ, pressur-
izer; SF, steam flow; S/G (A), steam generator in loop A; S/G (B),
steam generator in loop B; SGTR (A), steam generator tube rupture
in loop A; SLB (A), steam line break in loop A; T, temperature.weights to the IV can be evaluated in a similarmanner. The set
of the informational importance was then calculated by
incorporating all the relative weights obtained from the
judgment matrices. The same method was applied to calcu-
late the sets of informational importance for LOCA, SLB (A),
and FLB (A). Table 3 shows the sets of informational impor-
tance for LOCA, SGTR (A), SLB (A), and FLB (A). The sets of
informational importance for SGTR (B), SLB (B), and FLB (B) are
easily obtained by exchanging the informational importance
of the relevant indicators of S/G (A) with those of S/G (B).3.4. Training and knowledge (mental model) evaluation
The main experimental study included Experiments 1 and 2.
The extent of an operator's knowledgewas evaluated to see its
effect. The operator's knowledge develops through a training
program that the operator has undergone. Hence, the level of
the operator's knowledge before training in Experiment 1 is
considered to be poor. The operator's knowledge level after
the training in Experiment 1 is deemed to be well constructed.
In order to consider an intermediate level of operator knowl-
edge (i.e., forgetting factor), Experiment 2 was conducted 6
months after Experiment 1. Knowledge fades with time as
long as no training is provided. The level of operator's
knowledge before the training in Experiment 2 is considered
better than that before the training in Experiment 1 and
poorer than that after the training in Experiments 1 and 2. The
operator's knowledge before the training in Experiment 2 is,
therefore, deemed as intermediately constructed. The
training includes learning the behaviors of the FISA2 simu-
lator and exercising the simulations by the participants, and
testing of their knowledge. First, behaviors of the FISA2
simulator were presented and explained in detail to the par-
ticipants. Second, they were acquainted with system behav-
iors with hands-on exercises. It should be noted that the
participating operators were not trained to pay selective
attention in a predefined way, but to be acquainted with sys-
tem behaviors so that they could control their attention ac-
cording to their knowledge. Finally, the operators required to
explain system behaviors in each accident case, which was an
evaluation test of their knowledge. This test was performed
with questionnaires in order to see the completeness of the
training. The operators passed the test only when they
answered all the questions correctly. The training was iter-
ated until a satisfactory test result was obtained. The effects of
the training and time interval on the knowledge were inves-
tigated with four questionnaires on the system behaviors of
Table 6 e Concordance rate for the SLB (B) case.
Experiment CAR (%) CR-1 (%) CR-2 (%)
Component level
1B 0 40.00 Not available
2B 26.67 66.67 100
1A 93.33 73.33 78.57
2A 100 73.33 73.33
Indicator level
1B 0 53.33 Not available
2B 26.67 46.67 75.00
1A 93.33 80.00 85.71
2A 100 60 60
CAR, correct answer rate; CR-1, concordance rate between the
inserted accident and the inferred result from the best SAE evalu-
ation; CR-2, concordance rate (CR-1) given that the operator has
diagnosed the situation correctly; SAE, selective attention effec-
tiveness; SLB (B), steam line break in loop B; 1A, Experiment 1 after
training; 1B, Experiment 1 before training; 2A, Experiment 2 after
training; 2B, Experiment 2 before training.
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sisted of 20 questions. The participating operators were
requested to answer how process parameters could be
developed in a given accident scenario. The average score of
the four questionnaires was used as a mental model score
(MMS). The MMS was calculated before and after the training
in Experiments 1 and 2.
3.5. Experiment results
Knowledge of an operator improves after training and
worsens after a time interval during which the operator has
no training or experience. The degree of thementalmodelwas
controlled as poor, intermediate, and well constructed by the
training and the time interval (6 months). The MMS before the
training was lower than that after the training in Experiments
1 and 2, as summarized in Table 4. The t tests based on pair-
wise comparison before and after the trainingwere performed
to statistically analyze the results of the MMSs. The t test re-
sults show that there is a statistically significant difference
between the MMSs. The averaged MMSs improved in order of
1B (31.98), 2B (43.95), 1A (88.37), and 2A (97.26) (Table 4) (1A
representing Experiment 1 after training; 1B, Experiment 1
before training; 2A, Experiment 2 after training; and 2B,
Experiment 2 before training).
CRs between the inserted accident and the inference re-
sults based on the best (i.e., lowest) SAE evaluation are sum-
marized in Tables 5 and 6 for the SGTR (A) and SLB (B) cases,
respectively. The CRswere calculated from the eyemovement
data at the component and indicator levels. AOIs at the
component level include the PRZ, S/G (A), S/G (B), and other
cases. AOIs at the indicator level include all the indicators
provided.
In the SGTR (A) case, as the operator's knowledge of system
behaviors improved in order of 1B (31.98), 2B (43.95), 1A (88.37),
and 2A (97.26), the number of correct answers (diagnosis)
increased, as shown in the CAR (correct answer rate) column
in Table 5. In addition, CR-1, the CR between the inserted ac-
cident and the inference results based on the best SAETable 5 e Concordance rate for the SGTR (A) case.
Experiment CAR (%) CR-1 (%) CR-2 (%)
Component level
1B 13 0 0
2B 40 13.33 50.00
1A 100 73.33 73.33
2A 100 80.00 80.00
Indicator level
1B 13 6.67 0
2B 40 53.33 83.33
1A 100 86.67 86.67
2A 100 93.33 93.33
CAR, correct answer rate; CR-1, concordance rate between the
inserted accident and the inferred result from the best SAE evalu-
ation; CR-2, concordance rate (CR-1) given that the operator has
diagnosed the situation correctly; SAE, selective attention effec-
tiveness; SGTR (A), steam generator tube rupture in loop A; 1A,
Experiment 1 after training; 1B, Experiment 1 before training; 2A,
Experiment 2 after training; 2B, Experiment 2 before training.evaluation, became better. CR-2, the CR (CR-1) given that the
operator has diagnosed the situation correctly, shows better
results than CR-1 even when the operators had an interme-
diate level (2B) of knowledge about system behaviors. This
means that even though the operators did not have enough
knowledge of system behaviors, if they understand the situ-
ation correctly, a higher-accuracy inference can be made. In
both experiments after the training (1A and 2A) no difference
was observed between CR-1 and CR-2, because all the opera-
tors reported correct answers after the experiments. The CRs
at the indicator level were evaluated better than those at the
component level, which means that if more detailed infor-
mation on operators' eye movement is obtained, a higher-
accuracy inference can be made. In the SGTR (A) experi-
ments, operators' thoughts (understanding or diagnosis of a
current situation) can be inferred from their eye movement
data with an accuracy of 80% at the component level and
93.33% at the indicator level, given that the operators have
well-constructed knowledge such as in the 2A case.
In the SLB (B) case, similar results were observed except for
Experiment 2 (2B and 2A), where the faulty HMI design was
used to investigate the faulty design effect, as shown in Table
6. As the operators' knowledge improved, the CAR increased
and CR-1 improved except for Experiment 2. The design faults
in S/G (A) and S/G (B) level indicators were intentionally
inserted in the GUI in the SLB (B) cases, as shown in Fig. 2. The
averaged FIRs for the 15 operators, which are used to inves-
tigate the faulty design effect, are given in Table 7. The FIR is
the ratio of attentional resources spent on an information
source to the importance of the information source. The FIR
represents attentional-resource effectiveness in terms of each
information source. Consequently, all FIRs should approach
unity for the best effectiveness. The faulty design effect could
be observed only at the indicator level, as shown in the FIR
values of S/G (A)-L and S/G (B)-L for the SLB (B) cases in Table 7.
The FIR values of S/G (A) and S/G (B) levels with the faulty HMI
design show remarkably poor performance (bold and under-
lined figures) that is far from unity (FIRs < 0.5). In the
debriefing after the experiments, most participating operators
Table 7 e Averaged FIRs on information sources.
Indicators
(AOIs)
SGTR (A) SLB (B)
1B 2B 1A 2A 1B 2B 1A 2A
Component level
PRZ 1.06 0.91 1.01 0.96 0.89 1.04 0.96 1.07
S/G (A) 0.51 0.67 0.91 0.89 0.57 0.72 0.82 0.82
S/G (B) 0.74 1.12 0.91 1.12 0.66 0.81 0.92 0.96
Indicator level
PRZ-L 1.31 1.40 1.28 1.31 1.38 2.0 1.41 1.83
PRZ-P 0.95 0.67 0.80 0.87 0.56 0.61 0.79 0.73
PRZ-T 0.77 0.73 0.81 0.69 0.66 0.71 0.67 0.74
S/G (A)-L 0.65 0.77 1.00 0.96 0.86 0.30 0.77 0.40
S/G (A)-FF 0.43 0.64 0.88 0.79 0.56 0.90 0.70 0.86
S/G (A)-SF 0.54 0.61 0.90 0.97 0.53 0.69 0.98 0.98
S/G (B)-L 0.71 1.05 0.82 1.19 0.71 0.39 0.89 0.45
S/G (B)-FF 0.72 1.08 0.87 0.84 0.67 1.04 0.85 1.03
S/G (B)-SF 0.75 1.14 1.07 1.36 0.65 0.90 1.04 1.29
AOI, area of interest; FF, feed flow; FIR, fixation to importance ratio;
L, level; P, pressure; PRZ, pressurizer; SF, steam flow; S/G (A), steam
generator in loop A; S/G (B), steam generator in loop B; SGTR (A),
steam generator tube rupture in loop A; SLB (B), steam line break in
loop B; 1A, Experiment 1 after training; 1B, Experiment 1 before
training; 2A, Experiment 2 after training; 2B, Experiment 2 before
training.
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in S/G (A) and S/G (B) levels with the faulty HMI design. The
operators adopted a strategy of focusing on the other two in-
dicators, S/G FF and S/G SF, instead of focusing on the S/G
level, because they thought that focusing on S/G FF and S/G SF
would be more effective. This faulty design was made at the
indicator level, and no remarkably poor performance
(FIRs < 0.5) with respect to FIR values was observed at the
component level, which leads to no remarkable decrease in
the CR values in Experiment 2 compared with those in
Experiment 1 at the component level, as shown in Table 6.
However, at the indicator level, remarkable decreases in the
CR values in Experiment 2 were observed. The CR-1 value was
decreased from 53.33% in the 1B case to 46.67% in the 2B case,
and from 80% in the 1A case to 60% in the 2A case, even
though the operators' knowledge and CAR were improved.
This means that if some design fault in the HMI exists, the
inference from the best SAE evaluation might be compro-
mised. In the SLB (B) experiments, operators' thoughts can be
inferred from their eye movement data with an accuracy of
73.33% at the component level and 80% at the indicator level,
given that the operators have well-constructed knowledge,
such as the 1A case.
If only the experimental cases with well-constructed
knowledge and no design fault in the HMI such as the SGTR
(A) cases of 1A and 2A and the SLB (B) case of 1A are consid-
ered, operators' thoughts can be inferred from their eye
movement data with an accuracy of 75.55% at the component
level and 86.67% at the indicator level on average.
The t -tests were conducted to statistically analyze the
difference between the mean of the SAE values of the 15 op-
erators for the inserted accident and that for each of the other
competing accidents, as shown in Table 8. The mean of the
SAE values for the inserted accident should be lower than that
for each of the other competing accidents. In the poorknowledge (mental model) cases of 1B at both the component
and the indicator levels, no statistically significant differences
were observed between themean of the inserted accident and
that of each of other competing accidents, except for the SLB
(B) case at the indicator level. Operators' eye movement is
likely to be governed by the bandwidth (change rate) when
operators do not have sufficient knowledge of system behav-
iors. Behaviors of the indicators of LOCA, SGTR (A), and FLB (A)
are considerably different from those of SLB (B) in terms of
bandwidth, as shown in Table 1, which is thought to result in
the statistical differences with a (significance level) ¼ 0.05
between the mean of SLB (B) and that of LOCA, SGTR (A), and
FLB (A). As the level of knowledge improves in order of 1B, 2B,
1A, and 2A, more cases of statistical differences between the
means were observed. This implies that if operators have
better knowledge, the inference based on the best SAE eval-
uation is made more precisely. More cases of statistical dif-
ferences between the means were observed at the indicator
level than at the component level, which supports the idea
that if more detailed information on operators' eyemovement
is obtained, a higher-accuracy inference can be made. In the
well-developed knowledge cases of 2A, especially at the SGTR
(A) indicator level, all the instances show statistically signifi-
cant differences between the means (i.e., 5 instances with
a ¼ 0.01 and one instance with a ¼ 0.05), as shown in Table 8.
Even in 1A case of the SGTR (A) indicator level, five instances
out of six show a statistical difference between the means
with a¼ 0.01. However, at the component level in the SGTR (A)
cases, the means between SGTR (A) and each of SLB (A) and
FLB (A) do not show significant differences, because their be-
haviors at the component level are slightly similar in terms of
bandwidth and expectancy, as can be inferred from Table 1. In
the cases of SLB (B), the behaviors of indicators of SLB (B) also
show a slightly similar pattern to those of SGTR (B) and FLB (B)
in terms of bandwidth and expectancy. Hence, they do not
show significant difference in their means of the SAE evalu-
ation. Otherwise, statistically significant differences were
observed in the SLB (B) cases such as 2B, 1A, and 2A (Table 8).4. Discussion
4.1. Applicable areas of the proposed inference method
In this study, a novel method for inference of operators'
thoughts (understanding or diagnosis of a current situation)
from their eye movement data was proposed and evaluated
with experiments using an NPP simulator. This method is
expected to be effectively applied to enhancing the safety of
NPP operations. In safety-critical and complex systems such
as NPPs, human errors have been considered as a serious
cause of accidents, especially after the Tree Mile Island acci-
dent. There have been two general approaches to cope with
human errors in NPP control rooms. The first approach is to
develop well-constructed training programs to which the
inferencemethod based on operators' eyemovement data can
be effectively applied. Operators' understanding or diagnosis
during a simulation training can be monitored in real time
with the inference method. Advice and/or recommendation
Table 8 e Statistical analysis (t test) of means of the SAE evaluation between inserted accident and other accidents.
Inserted accident Other accident Statistics (t value, p), degree of freedom ¼ 28
1B 2B 1A 2A
Component level
SGTR (A) LOCA (1.57, 0.06) (0.40, 0.35) (1.57, 0.06) (6.25, 0.00)a
SGTR(B) (0.03, 0.49) (0.49, 0.32) (2.13, 0.02)b (3.68, 0.00)a
SLB (A) (0.18, 0.43) (0.08, 0.47) (0.98, 0.17) (1.51, 0.07)
SLB (B) (0.10, 0.46) (0.34, 0.37) (2.53, 0.01)a (4.00, 0.00)a
FLB (A) (0.38, 0.35) (0.18, 0.43) (0.89, 0.19) (1.18, 0.12)
FLB (B) (0.31, 0.38) (0.33, 0.37) (2.00, 0.03)b (3.03, 0.00)a
SLB (B) LOCA (0.31, 0.38) (0.97, 0.17) (2.82, 0.00)a (3.94, 0.00)a
SGTR (A) (1.47, 0.08) (2.86, 0.00)a (3.11, 0.00)a (3.50, 0.00)a
SGTR (B) (0.51, 0.31) (0.22, 0.41) (0.47, 0.32) (0.51, 0.31)
SLB (A) (0.52, 0.30) (2.17, 0.02)b (2.01, 0.03)b (2.99, 0.00)a
FLB (A) (0.80, 0.22) (2.08, 0.02)b (1.86, 0.04)b (2.55, 0.01)a
FLB (B) (0.46, 0.32) (0.65, 0.26) (0.36, 0.36) (0.44, 0.33)
Indicator level
SGTR (A) LOCA (0.35, 0.37) (1.09, 0.14) (3.92, 0.00)a (6.72, 0.00)a
SGTR (B) (0.18, 0.43) (1.02, 0.16) (3.95, 0.00)a (3.74, 0.00)a
SLB (A) (1.55, 0.07) (2.12, 0.02)b (0.98, 0.17) (2.54, 0.00)a
SLB (B) (1.61, 0.06) (2.86, 0.00)a (6.75, 0.00)a (4.64, 0.00)a
FLB (A) (1.55, 0.07) (2.13, 0.02)b (3.52, 0.00)a (2.41, 0.01)b
FLB (B) (1.58, 0.06) (3.14, 0.00)a (6.89, 0.00)a (4.85, 0.00)a
SLB (B) LOCA (1.91, 0.03)b (3.64, 0.00)a (6.35, 0.00)a (5.87, 0.00)a
SGTR (A) (2.16, 0.02)b (2.91, 0.00)a (5.53, 0.00)a (3.75, 0.00)a
SGTR (B) (0.32, 0.38) (0.88, 0.19) (0.89, 0.19) (0.12, 0.45)
SLB (A) (1.69, 0.05) (3.20, 0.00)a (4.05, 0.00)a (3.29, 0.00)a
FLB (A) (2.30, 0.02)b (3.48, 0.00)a (4.03, 0.00)a (3.39, 0.00)a
FLB (B) (0.50, 0.31) (0.46, 0.33) (0.28, 0.39) (0.58, 0.28)
a p < 0.01.
b p < 0.05.
FLB (A), feed line break in loop A; FLB (B), feed line break in loop B; LOCA, loss of coolant accident; SAE, selective attention effectiveness; SGTR (A),
steam generator tube rupture in loop A; SGTR (B), steam generator tube rupture in loop B; SLB (A), steam line break in loop A; SLB (B), steam line
break in loop B; 1A, Experiment 1 after training; 1B, Experiment 1 before training; 2A, Experiment 2 after training; 2B, Experiment 2 before
training.
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results. In addition, operators' eye movement pattern can be
evaluated and operators can be trained to give their best
performance.
The second approach to reduce human errors in NPP con-
trol rooms is to design the NPP control room with improved
interfaces and operator support systems. Operator support
systems refer to the systems that provide useful information
to operators or automated systems used for preventing
human errors [3]. A new type of operator support system can
be developed based on the inference method proposed in this
study. An NPP is operated by a shift consisting of several op-
erators including a supervisor. When an abnormal situation
occurs, the supervisor needs to check other operators' un-
derstanding of the current situation. The inference method
can be applied to supply real-time information on other op-
erators' understanding of the current situation to the super-
visor. This kind of information can help the supervisormake a
diagnosis effectively when his or her diagnosis result agrees
with other operators' results, or monitor human errors that
might be committed by other operators with incorrect un-
derstanding. This kind of human error associated with
incorrect understanding has been considered as one of the
most significant human errors in NPPs.In addition, this method can be applied to human factor
validation, which is called integrated system validation in
nuclear industries, for the assessment of operators' moni-
toring and diagnosis performance. The objective of the inte-
grated system validation is to provide evidence that the
integrated system adequately supports plant personnel in the
safe operation of the relevant NPP [60]. Operators' tasks are
generally completed with cognitive activities such as moni-
toring and detection of the environment, situation assess-
ments, response planning, and response implementing [1].
Hence, the proposed method can be used for the assessment
of operators' monitoring and situation assessment abilities in
the integrated system validation.
4.2. Fidelity and limitations of the study
The main objective of this study is to show the feasibility of
inference of an operator's thoughts (understanding or diag-
nosis of a current situation) by analyzing the operator's eye
movement pattern using the SAE evaluation. As a first
attempt, a low fidelity simulator was used. The FISA2 simu-
lator was operated only on a single screen. In a full-scope
simulator, which has a lot of alarms and displays, naviga-
tion would bemade through various display screens as well as
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important to a situation. In this experimental study, naviga-
tion among screens was not needed because a single-screen
simulator was used. Obviously, navigation among screens is
expected to be costlier than that within a single screen.
Generally, information sources important to a situation were
frequently fixated during the experiments. However, infor-
mation sources not important to a situation were also fixated
by chance at a greater rate than expected. Eye fixation on a
single screen is relatively inexpensive. The operators who
participated in this study sometimes fixated on unimportant
information sources by chance, which is deemed as a type of
noise detrimental to the experimental results. Navigation is
thought to reduce this type of noise, because operators are
likely to spend their time focusing on important information
sources instead of looking at unimportant ones by chance.
However, the FIR and the SAEmight suffer from combinatorial
explosion due to a huge number of information sources
available for search in a full-scope simulator. Even though
operators working in commercial NPPs are generally highly
trained and experienced, and they have well-trained eye
scanning patterns in abnormal situations, they might fixate
on an unimportant information source by chance because of
the large number of information sources presented in control
rooms.
As an abnormal situation in NPPs is usually detected by the
onset of alarms, the alarm design definitely affects eye
movements. In this study, only indicators for process pa-
rameters are considered to see the feasibility of the method.
Further experimental studies considering alarm designs are
required. It should be noted that the participants of this
experimental study are not well-trained operators even
though they are graduate students majoring in nuclear engi-
neering disciplines. Further experiments with field operators
are required as well.4.3. Considerations for real-world applications
In most human factor studies or training in NPPs, operational
scenarios are determined in advance. Hence, operational sit-
uations are analyzed by evaluators (i.e., subjectmatter experts
or human factor experts) in advance. Attention should be paid
to the possibility that an operational strategy of operators
might differ from the optimal strategy analyzed by evaluators.
Sets of informational importance are obtained based on the
optimal strategy. Hence, if operators adopt a different strat-
egy, the informational importance should be modified taking
into consideration the different strategy. Evaluators should
carefully monitor operators' selective attention during sce-
narios and then analyzewith operators after the scenarios. If a
different strategy is adopted by operators, sets of informa-
tional importance should be modified accordingly. The FIR
and SAE should be re-evaluated with the modified sets of
informational importance. This kind of approach was applied
in an evaluation of personnel task performance [61]. An
optimal task solution was prepared in advance by evaluators.
If deviations were identified during the simulation, these de-
viations were reflected in the modification of the optimal task
solution.5. Conclusion
In this experimental study, a novel method for inference of an
operator's thoughts (understanding or diagnosis of a current
situation) from his or her eye movement data is proposed and
evaluated with an NPP simulator. The inference method was
developed based on the SAE evaluation, which represents how
effectively an operator attends to important information
sources. CRs between the simulated accident and the infer-
ence results based on the SAE evaluation were calculated for
15 operators. The CRs can be regarded as performance indexes
representing how well the proposed method can infer the
operator's thoughts from his or her eyemovement data. In the
experiments, about 80% of the operator's thoughts can be
correctly inferred using the proposed method. Hence, it is
concluded that the inference method has a great potential for
useful applications in NPPs, such as development of an
improved operator training program, a new type of operator
support system, and human performance measures for
human factor validation.Conflicts of interest
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